Coverart for item
The Resource Social and Political Foundations of Constitutions :

Social and Political Foundations of Constitutions :

Label
Social and Political Foundations of Constitutions :
Title
Social and Political Foundations of Constitutions :
Creator
Contributor
Subject
Language
eng
Member of
Cataloging source
MiAaPQ
http://library.link/vocab/creatorName
Galligan, Denis J
Dewey number
342
LC call number
K3165 -- .S63 2013eb
Literary form
non fiction
Nature of contents
dictionaries
http://library.link/vocab/relatedWorkOrContributorName
Versteeg, Mila
Series statement
Comparative Constitutional Law and Policy
http://library.link/vocab/subjectName
  • Constitutional law -- Political aspects
  • Constitutional law -- Social aspects
  • Constitutions
Label
Social and Political Foundations of Constitutions :
Instantiates
Publication
Copyright
Carrier category
online resource
Carrier category code
  • cr
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Color
multicolored
Content category
text
Content type code
  • txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Contents
  • Cover -- Social and Political Foundations of {u00AD}Constitutions -- Series -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Contributors -- Preface -- Part I Introduction -- 1 Theoretical Perspectives on the Social and Political Foundations of Constitutions -- 1.1 Introduction -- 1.2 What Is a Constitution? -- 1.3 Constitutions as Expressions of Values -- 1.3.1 National Values, Identity, and Mission Statements -- 1.3.2 Transnational Values and Diffusion -- 1.3.3 Democratic Values and the People -- 1.4 Constitutions as Manifestations of Power -- 1.5 Constitutions as Social Coordination -- 1.5.1 The Practical Value of Coordination Theory -- 1.5.2 Content and Coordination -- 1.5.3 Process and Coordination -- 1.5.4 Critiques of Coordination Theory -- 1.6 Constitutions as Social Contracts -- 1.7 Conclusion -- References -- Part II Theoretical Perspectives -- 2 Why a Constitution? -- 2.1 Introduction: Two Strategic Schools -- 2.2 Contractarian Theories -- 2.3 Coordination Theories -- 2.4 Caveats and Clarifications -- 2.5 What Constitutions Do -- 2.6 Limits on Government -- 2.7 Concluding Remarks -- 2.8 Methodological Note -- References -- 3 Constitutions as Mission Statements -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Some Existing Accounts of the Purpose of Democratic Constitutions -- 3.2.1 The Social Contract -- 3.2.2 Limited Government -- 3.2.3 Coordination and Stability -- 3.3 Constitutions as Mission Statements -- 3.3.1 The Nature of Mission Statements -- 3.3.2 The Forms of Mission Statement Provisions -- 3.3.3 Four Positive Potential Functions of Mission Statement Provisions -- 3.4 Objections -- 3.4.1 Mission Statements Are Destabilising -- 3.4.2 Mission Statements Are Pious {u00AD}Wishes -- 3.4.3 Mission Statements Give Effect to Elite Bargains -- 3.4.4 Mission Statements Are Inescapably Conservative -- 3.4.5 Mission Statements Invite Judicial Supremacy -- 3.5 Conclusion
  • References -- 4 Transnational Constitutionalism -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Mechanisms of Constitutional Diffusion -- 4.3 Altered Material Payoffs: Coercion and Competition -- 4.3.1 Coercion -- 4.3.2 Competition -- 4.4 Altered Beliefs: Learning -- 4.5 Social Benefits and Cognitive Pressures: Acculturation -- 4.6 The End of Constitutional History? -- 4.7 Conclusion -- References -- 5 The People, the Constitution, and the Idea of Representation -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 The People in the Constitution -- 5.3 On the Nature of Constitutions -- 5.4 The People and Their Representation -- 5.5 Representation as the Foundation of Modern Constitutions -- 5.6 Representation, Democracy, and Rights -- References -- 6 The Strategic Foundations of Constitutions -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 The Ideational Story -- 6.3 The Functionalist Story -- 6.4 Constitutions as Strategic Instruments of Power -- 6.5 From Theory to Practice -- 6.6 Conclusion -- References -- 7 Constitutions as Contract, Constitutions as Charters -- 7.1 Introduction -- 7.2 The Coordination Critique: Three Objections -- 7.2.1 Agreement -- 7.2.2 Third-Party Enforcement -- 7.2.3 Ongoing Governance -- 7.3 Constitutions as Contracts -- 7.3.1 Constitutional Negotiation -- 7.3.1.1 Constitutional Incompleteness and Bargaining -- 7.3.2 The Content of Constitutions -- 7.3.3 Changed Circumstances and Constitutional Renegotiation -- 7.4 Conclusion -- References -- Part III Case Studies -- 8 Accidental Constitutionalism -- 8.1 Introduction -- 8.2 A Brief History of Israeli Constitution{u00AD}-Making and the Rise of Accidental Constitutionalism -- 8.2.1 Legislative Constitution-Making -- 8.2.2 Judicial Constitution-Making -- 8.3 Three THEORIES OF Accidental Constitutionalism -- 8.3.1 The Constructivist Thesis -- 8.3.2 The Political Fragmentation Thesis -- 8.3.3 The Political Hegemony Thesis
  • 8.4 The Consequences of Accidental Constitutionalism -- 8.4.1 Delegation of Power to the Judiciary -- 8.4.2 Cessation of Legislative Constitutional Development and Increase in Court{u00AD}-Curbing Efforts -- 8.4.3 Legitimacy of the Supreme Court -- 8.4.4 Compliance with Judicial Decisions -- 8.4.5 Constitutional Discourse and Constitutional Ignorance -- 8.5 Conclusion -- References -- 5 Knesset Records 1743 (1950). -- 9 The Myth of the Imposed Constitution -- 9.1 Introduction: The Mysterious Case of the Imposed Yet Enduring Constitution -- 9.2 The U.S. Role in the Drafting of the 1947 Constitution -- 9.3 Lost in Translation? -- 9.4 Three Mechanisms of Informal Constitutional Adaptation: Nonenforcement, Interpretation, and Functional Obsolescence -- 9.5 Formal versus Informal Constitutional Adaptation: Which Way and Why? -- 9.6 Public Support for the "Imposed" and "Alien" Constitution -- 9.7 A Model of the Constitutional Policy-Making Game -- 9.8 Conclusion: The Myth of the Unimposed Constitution -- References -- 10 Social, Political and Philosophical Foundations of the Irish Constitutional Order -- 10.1 Introduction -- 10.2 Immediate Historical Background to the 1922 {u00AD}Irish Free State Constitution -- 10.2.1 The Rise of Sinn Féin and the First Dáil -- 10.2.2 From the First Dáil to the 1922 Irish Free State Constitution -- 10.2.3 The Drafting of the 1922 Constitution -- 10.3 Some Points of Particular Relevance for Comparative Legal Study -- 10.3.1 Transplantation and Transformation of British and Dominion Constitutional Form and Substance -- 10.3.1.1 The Modification of British Practice in the Constitution -- 10.3.1.2 Innovations in the Description of British and Dominion Practice -- 10.3.2 Vocational Councils -- 10.3.3 Citizen Initiatives and Referendums -- 10.3.3.1 Referral of Legislation -- 10.3.3.2 Popular Authorization for the Declaration of War
  • 10.3.3.3 Approval of Constitutional Amendments by Referendum -- 10.3.4 Rights Declarations and Judicial Review of the {u00AD}Constitutional Validity of Primary Legislation -- 10.3.4.1 Rights Declarations -- 10.3.4.2 Judicial Review -- 10.3.5 The Philosophical Underpinnings of the 1922 Constitution -- 10.3.5.1 The "Structure of Normality" of pre{u00AD}-Independence Irish Nationalism -- 10.3.5.2 Evidence from the Absence of Debate: The Source of Political Authority -- 10.3.5.3 Evidence from the Presence of Debate: The Purpose of a Written Constitution and the Appropriate Content of Rights De -- 10.4 Conclusion -- 10.5 Appendix: Influence of the 1922 Constitution on the 1937 Constitution -- References -- 11 South Sudan's Dualistic Constitution -- 11.1 Introduction -- 11.2 Constitutional Diffusion, Transnationalism, and Institutional Self-Dealing -- 11.3 Southern Sudan: Kush to Independence -- 11.3.1 Colonization and Civil War -- 11.3.2 The Modern Schism -- 11.3.3 The Comprehensive Peace Agreement -- 11.3.4 The 2005 Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan -- 11.3.5 The 2011 Transitional Constitution of South Sudan -- 11.4 Global Constitutionalism Meets Local Structuralism -- 11.4.1 The Transnational Bill of Rights -- 11.4.2 Self-Dealing in Constitutional Structure -- 11.5 Conclusion -- References -- 12 New Zealand: Abandoning Westminster? -- 12.1 Introduction -- 12.2 Constitution Act 1986 -- 12.3 Electoral Change -- 12.4 Principal Dividing-Power Changes -- 12.4.1 The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act (NZBORA) 1990 -- 12.4.2 Māori Treaty Rights -- 12.4.3 Other Dividing-Power Reforms -- 12.5 Political Triggers, Not Constitutional Moments? -- 12.5.1 "Aversive" Constitutionalism -- 12.5.2 Electoral Reform and Elite-Mass Interaction -- 12.6 The Constitutional Limitations, and Significance, of the 1984-1993 Period -- References -- 13 The Juristic Republic of Iran
  • 13.1 Introduction -- 13.2 The Road to the Jurist -- 13.3 Contesting the Discourse -- 13.4 Polemics -- 13.5 Publicising the Jurist and the End of Divinity -- 13.6 Closing Thoughts -- References -- 14 Neo-Bolivarian Constitutional Design -- 14.1 Introduction -- 14.2 Constitutions in the Latin American Context -- 14.3 Establishing the Constitutional Trend -- 14.4 Venezuela -- 14.4.1 Setting the Stage for the 1999 Constitution -- 14.4.2 The Document Itself -- 14.4.2.1 Ideological and Aspirational Content -- 14.4.2.2 Evidence of Radicalism -- 14.4.2.3 Constitutional Hybridism -- 14.5 Ecuador -- 14.5.1 Setting the Stage for the 2008 Document -- 14.5.2 The Document Itself -- 14.5.2.1 Ideological and Aspirational Content -- 14.5.2.2 Evidence of Radical Impulse -- 14.5.2.3 Constitutional Hybridism -- 14.6 Bolivia -- 14.6.1 Setting the Stage for the 2009 Document -- 14.6.2 The Document Itself -- 14.6.2.1 Ideological and Aspirational Content -- 14.6.2.2 Evidence of Radical Influence -- 14.6.2.3 Constitutional Hybridism -- 14.7 Conclusion -- References -- Constitutions -- 15 The Constitution as Agreement to Agree -- 15.1 Introduction -- 15.2 The Social and Political Foundations of the 1971 Constitution -- 15.2.1 The Emergence of Modern Egypt and Early Debates about Executive Constraint -- 15.2.2 The Contest between Authoritarians, Liberals, and Islamists: 1922-{u00AD}1971 -- 15.2.3 The Drafting of the 1971 Constitution -- 15.2.4 Deepening Ambiguity: Implementing Legislation and the 1980 Amendments -- 15.3 The Social and Political Effects of the Ambiguous 1971 Constitution -- 15.3.1 Executive Entrenchment and the New Incentive for Liberal-Islamist Cooperation -- 15.3.2 Responses to Executive Entrenchment: The Formation of an Embryonic Liberal{u00AD}-Islamist Alliance -- 15.4 Surprising Solicitude for the 1971 Constitution -- 15.5 Conclusion -- References
  • 16 Explaining the Constitutionalization of {u00AD}Social Rights
Control code
UMKCLawddaEBC1394554
Dimensions
unknown
Extent
1 online resource (694 pages)
Form of item
online
Isbn
9781107420557
Media category
computer
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Media type code
  • c
Note
UMKC Law: DDA record.
Sound
unknown sound
Specific material designation
remote
System control number
  • (MiAaPQ)EBC1394554
  • (Au-PeEL)EBL1394554
  • (CaPaEBR)ebr10774077
  • (OCoLC)864552386
Label
Social and Political Foundations of Constitutions :
Publication
Copyright
Carrier category
online resource
Carrier category code
  • cr
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Color
multicolored
Content category
text
Content type code
  • txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Contents
  • Cover -- Social and Political Foundations of {u00AD}Constitutions -- Series -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Contributors -- Preface -- Part I Introduction -- 1 Theoretical Perspectives on the Social and Political Foundations of Constitutions -- 1.1 Introduction -- 1.2 What Is a Constitution? -- 1.3 Constitutions as Expressions of Values -- 1.3.1 National Values, Identity, and Mission Statements -- 1.3.2 Transnational Values and Diffusion -- 1.3.3 Democratic Values and the People -- 1.4 Constitutions as Manifestations of Power -- 1.5 Constitutions as Social Coordination -- 1.5.1 The Practical Value of Coordination Theory -- 1.5.2 Content and Coordination -- 1.5.3 Process and Coordination -- 1.5.4 Critiques of Coordination Theory -- 1.6 Constitutions as Social Contracts -- 1.7 Conclusion -- References -- Part II Theoretical Perspectives -- 2 Why a Constitution? -- 2.1 Introduction: Two Strategic Schools -- 2.2 Contractarian Theories -- 2.3 Coordination Theories -- 2.4 Caveats and Clarifications -- 2.5 What Constitutions Do -- 2.6 Limits on Government -- 2.7 Concluding Remarks -- 2.8 Methodological Note -- References -- 3 Constitutions as Mission Statements -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Some Existing Accounts of the Purpose of Democratic Constitutions -- 3.2.1 The Social Contract -- 3.2.2 Limited Government -- 3.2.3 Coordination and Stability -- 3.3 Constitutions as Mission Statements -- 3.3.1 The Nature of Mission Statements -- 3.3.2 The Forms of Mission Statement Provisions -- 3.3.3 Four Positive Potential Functions of Mission Statement Provisions -- 3.4 Objections -- 3.4.1 Mission Statements Are Destabilising -- 3.4.2 Mission Statements Are Pious {u00AD}Wishes -- 3.4.3 Mission Statements Give Effect to Elite Bargains -- 3.4.4 Mission Statements Are Inescapably Conservative -- 3.4.5 Mission Statements Invite Judicial Supremacy -- 3.5 Conclusion
  • References -- 4 Transnational Constitutionalism -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Mechanisms of Constitutional Diffusion -- 4.3 Altered Material Payoffs: Coercion and Competition -- 4.3.1 Coercion -- 4.3.2 Competition -- 4.4 Altered Beliefs: Learning -- 4.5 Social Benefits and Cognitive Pressures: Acculturation -- 4.6 The End of Constitutional History? -- 4.7 Conclusion -- References -- 5 The People, the Constitution, and the Idea of Representation -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 The People in the Constitution -- 5.3 On the Nature of Constitutions -- 5.4 The People and Their Representation -- 5.5 Representation as the Foundation of Modern Constitutions -- 5.6 Representation, Democracy, and Rights -- References -- 6 The Strategic Foundations of Constitutions -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 The Ideational Story -- 6.3 The Functionalist Story -- 6.4 Constitutions as Strategic Instruments of Power -- 6.5 From Theory to Practice -- 6.6 Conclusion -- References -- 7 Constitutions as Contract, Constitutions as Charters -- 7.1 Introduction -- 7.2 The Coordination Critique: Three Objections -- 7.2.1 Agreement -- 7.2.2 Third-Party Enforcement -- 7.2.3 Ongoing Governance -- 7.3 Constitutions as Contracts -- 7.3.1 Constitutional Negotiation -- 7.3.1.1 Constitutional Incompleteness and Bargaining -- 7.3.2 The Content of Constitutions -- 7.3.3 Changed Circumstances and Constitutional Renegotiation -- 7.4 Conclusion -- References -- Part III Case Studies -- 8 Accidental Constitutionalism -- 8.1 Introduction -- 8.2 A Brief History of Israeli Constitution{u00AD}-Making and the Rise of Accidental Constitutionalism -- 8.2.1 Legislative Constitution-Making -- 8.2.2 Judicial Constitution-Making -- 8.3 Three THEORIES OF Accidental Constitutionalism -- 8.3.1 The Constructivist Thesis -- 8.3.2 The Political Fragmentation Thesis -- 8.3.3 The Political Hegemony Thesis
  • 8.4 The Consequences of Accidental Constitutionalism -- 8.4.1 Delegation of Power to the Judiciary -- 8.4.2 Cessation of Legislative Constitutional Development and Increase in Court{u00AD}-Curbing Efforts -- 8.4.3 Legitimacy of the Supreme Court -- 8.4.4 Compliance with Judicial Decisions -- 8.4.5 Constitutional Discourse and Constitutional Ignorance -- 8.5 Conclusion -- References -- 5 Knesset Records 1743 (1950). -- 9 The Myth of the Imposed Constitution -- 9.1 Introduction: The Mysterious Case of the Imposed Yet Enduring Constitution -- 9.2 The U.S. Role in the Drafting of the 1947 Constitution -- 9.3 Lost in Translation? -- 9.4 Three Mechanisms of Informal Constitutional Adaptation: Nonenforcement, Interpretation, and Functional Obsolescence -- 9.5 Formal versus Informal Constitutional Adaptation: Which Way and Why? -- 9.6 Public Support for the "Imposed" and "Alien" Constitution -- 9.7 A Model of the Constitutional Policy-Making Game -- 9.8 Conclusion: The Myth of the Unimposed Constitution -- References -- 10 Social, Political and Philosophical Foundations of the Irish Constitutional Order -- 10.1 Introduction -- 10.2 Immediate Historical Background to the 1922 {u00AD}Irish Free State Constitution -- 10.2.1 The Rise of Sinn Féin and the First Dáil -- 10.2.2 From the First Dáil to the 1922 Irish Free State Constitution -- 10.2.3 The Drafting of the 1922 Constitution -- 10.3 Some Points of Particular Relevance for Comparative Legal Study -- 10.3.1 Transplantation and Transformation of British and Dominion Constitutional Form and Substance -- 10.3.1.1 The Modification of British Practice in the Constitution -- 10.3.1.2 Innovations in the Description of British and Dominion Practice -- 10.3.2 Vocational Councils -- 10.3.3 Citizen Initiatives and Referendums -- 10.3.3.1 Referral of Legislation -- 10.3.3.2 Popular Authorization for the Declaration of War
  • 10.3.3.3 Approval of Constitutional Amendments by Referendum -- 10.3.4 Rights Declarations and Judicial Review of the {u00AD}Constitutional Validity of Primary Legislation -- 10.3.4.1 Rights Declarations -- 10.3.4.2 Judicial Review -- 10.3.5 The Philosophical Underpinnings of the 1922 Constitution -- 10.3.5.1 The "Structure of Normality" of pre{u00AD}-Independence Irish Nationalism -- 10.3.5.2 Evidence from the Absence of Debate: The Source of Political Authority -- 10.3.5.3 Evidence from the Presence of Debate: The Purpose of a Written Constitution and the Appropriate Content of Rights De -- 10.4 Conclusion -- 10.5 Appendix: Influence of the 1922 Constitution on the 1937 Constitution -- References -- 11 South Sudan's Dualistic Constitution -- 11.1 Introduction -- 11.2 Constitutional Diffusion, Transnationalism, and Institutional Self-Dealing -- 11.3 Southern Sudan: Kush to Independence -- 11.3.1 Colonization and Civil War -- 11.3.2 The Modern Schism -- 11.3.3 The Comprehensive Peace Agreement -- 11.3.4 The 2005 Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan -- 11.3.5 The 2011 Transitional Constitution of South Sudan -- 11.4 Global Constitutionalism Meets Local Structuralism -- 11.4.1 The Transnational Bill of Rights -- 11.4.2 Self-Dealing in Constitutional Structure -- 11.5 Conclusion -- References -- 12 New Zealand: Abandoning Westminster? -- 12.1 Introduction -- 12.2 Constitution Act 1986 -- 12.3 Electoral Change -- 12.4 Principal Dividing-Power Changes -- 12.4.1 The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act (NZBORA) 1990 -- 12.4.2 Māori Treaty Rights -- 12.4.3 Other Dividing-Power Reforms -- 12.5 Political Triggers, Not Constitutional Moments? -- 12.5.1 "Aversive" Constitutionalism -- 12.5.2 Electoral Reform and Elite-Mass Interaction -- 12.6 The Constitutional Limitations, and Significance, of the 1984-1993 Period -- References -- 13 The Juristic Republic of Iran
  • 13.1 Introduction -- 13.2 The Road to the Jurist -- 13.3 Contesting the Discourse -- 13.4 Polemics -- 13.5 Publicising the Jurist and the End of Divinity -- 13.6 Closing Thoughts -- References -- 14 Neo-Bolivarian Constitutional Design -- 14.1 Introduction -- 14.2 Constitutions in the Latin American Context -- 14.3 Establishing the Constitutional Trend -- 14.4 Venezuela -- 14.4.1 Setting the Stage for the 1999 Constitution -- 14.4.2 The Document Itself -- 14.4.2.1 Ideological and Aspirational Content -- 14.4.2.2 Evidence of Radicalism -- 14.4.2.3 Constitutional Hybridism -- 14.5 Ecuador -- 14.5.1 Setting the Stage for the 2008 Document -- 14.5.2 The Document Itself -- 14.5.2.1 Ideological and Aspirational Content -- 14.5.2.2 Evidence of Radical Impulse -- 14.5.2.3 Constitutional Hybridism -- 14.6 Bolivia -- 14.6.1 Setting the Stage for the 2009 Document -- 14.6.2 The Document Itself -- 14.6.2.1 Ideological and Aspirational Content -- 14.6.2.2 Evidence of Radical Influence -- 14.6.2.3 Constitutional Hybridism -- 14.7 Conclusion -- References -- Constitutions -- 15 The Constitution as Agreement to Agree -- 15.1 Introduction -- 15.2 The Social and Political Foundations of the 1971 Constitution -- 15.2.1 The Emergence of Modern Egypt and Early Debates about Executive Constraint -- 15.2.2 The Contest between Authoritarians, Liberals, and Islamists: 1922-{u00AD}1971 -- 15.2.3 The Drafting of the 1971 Constitution -- 15.2.4 Deepening Ambiguity: Implementing Legislation and the 1980 Amendments -- 15.3 The Social and Political Effects of the Ambiguous 1971 Constitution -- 15.3.1 Executive Entrenchment and the New Incentive for Liberal-Islamist Cooperation -- 15.3.2 Responses to Executive Entrenchment: The Formation of an Embryonic Liberal{u00AD}-Islamist Alliance -- 15.4 Surprising Solicitude for the 1971 Constitution -- 15.5 Conclusion -- References
  • 16 Explaining the Constitutionalization of {u00AD}Social Rights
Control code
UMKCLawddaEBC1394554
Dimensions
unknown
Extent
1 online resource (694 pages)
Form of item
online
Isbn
9781107420557
Media category
computer
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Media type code
  • c
Note
UMKC Law: DDA record.
Sound
unknown sound
Specific material designation
remote
System control number
  • (MiAaPQ)EBC1394554
  • (Au-PeEL)EBL1394554
  • (CaPaEBR)ebr10774077
  • (OCoLC)864552386

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      500 E. 52nd Street, Kansas City, MO, 64110, US
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