Coverart for item
The Resource Regulating Corporate Criminal Liability :

Regulating Corporate Criminal Liability :

Label
Regulating Corporate Criminal Liability :
Title
Regulating Corporate Criminal Liability :
Creator
Contributor
Subject
Language
eng
Cataloging source
MiAaPQ
http://library.link/vocab/creatorName
Brodowski, Dominik
Dewey number
340
LC call number
K-KZ
Literary form
non fiction
Nature of contents
dictionaries
http://library.link/vocab/relatedWorkOrContributorName
  • Espinoza de los Monteros de la Parr, Manuel
  • Tiedemann, Klaus
  • Vogel, Joachim
http://library.link/vocab/subjectName
  • Corporation law
  • Criminal liability
  • International criminal law
Label
Regulating Corporate Criminal Liability :
Instantiates
Publication
Copyright
Carrier category
online resource
Carrier category code
  • cr
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Color
multicolored
Content category
text
Content type code
  • txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Contents
  • Preface -- Contents -- List of Contributors -- Regulating Corporate Criminal Liability: An Introduction -- 1 On the Need to Regulate Corporate Criminal Liability -- 2 Diverging Regulatory Approaches in Corporate Criminal Liability -- 2.1 Attributing Corporate Crimes to Corporations and the Sanctioning of Corporations -- 2.2 Corporate Criminal Procedure -- 2.3 Transnational and International Corporate Criminal Justice -- 3 Rethinking Corporate Criminal Justice -- 4 On the Third Symposium for Young Penalists -- References -- Part I: Regulatory Options in Corporate Criminal Liability -- Corporate Criminal Liability as a Third Track -- 1 Historical Introduction -- 2 Deterring Economic Actors -- 3 Regulatory Options in Corporate Criminal Law -- 4 Conclusions -- References -- Where Is the Moral Indignation Over Corporate Crime? -- 1 What Happened to Our Moral Indignation? -- 2 Faux Indignation Meets Corporate Inauthenticity -- 3 Measured Indignation and the Bad Guys -- References -- A Psychological Perspective on Punishing Corporate Entities -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Why Do We Punish Individuals and Why Should We Punish Collective Entities? -- 3 The Group/Corporate Mind -- 4 Over-Personalization of Intent -- 4.1 Individual Versus Organizational Based Judgments of Culpability and Punishment -- 5 The Provision of Rights to Corporations Versus Individuals -- 6 The Legal Implications of the Psychology of Culpability and Punishment -- 7 Summary -- References -- Decision and Punishment: Or-Hold Bankers Responsible! Corporate Criminal Liability from an Economic Perspective -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Who Decides? -- 3 Who Is Punished? -- 4 What to Do? -- References -- Corporate Criminal Liability from a Comparative Perspective -- 1 Status of Corporate Criminal Liability -- 1.1 International Development -- 1.2 National Developments -- 2 Prevailing Models
  • 2.1 Construction of Responsibility -- 2.1.1 Common Standard: The Individualized Model -- 2.1.2 Open Questions -- 2.2 Sanctions -- 3 New Approaches -- 3.1 Shortcomings of the Individualized Model -- 3.2 The New Emphasis on Prevention -- 3.2.1 Compliance Movement -- 3.2.2 Due Supervision and Control -- 3.2.3 Opening the Discussion -- 3.3 Alternative Solutions -- 3.3.1 Responsibility -- 3.3.2 Sanctions -- 3.3.3 Proceedings -- 4 Perspectives -- 4.1 Preventive Effects of Compliance and Corporate Criminal Liability -- 4.2 Regulated Self-Regulation -- 4.2.1 Self-Regulation and Regulation -- 4.2.2 Regulated Self-Regulation -- 4.2.3 Levels of Regulated Self-Regulation -- Informal Support by the State -- Rewarding Compliance -- Sanctioning the Lack of Compliance -- Excluding Responsibility -- General Obligation to Implement Compliance Programs -- 5 Conclusion -- References -- Part II: Models in Attributing Criminal Liability to Corporations -- The Austrian Model of Attributing Criminal Responsibility to Legal Entities -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Liability Model -- 3 Criteria for Establishing Criminal Responsibility -- 3.1 T̀̀riggering Personś ́-- 3.2 Underlying Criminal Offence (Anlasstat) -- 3.2.1 Offences Committed by Decision Makers -- 3.2.2 Offences Committed by Staff-Members -- 3.3 Additional Connection Between the Criminal Offence and the Sphere of the Entity -- 4 Summary Overview -- References -- The Belgian décumul Rule: A sui generis Approach to Criminal Liability of Corporate Agents -- 1 Development of the Concept of Corporate Criminal Liability in Belgium -- 2 Article 5 of the Belgian Criminal Code -- 3 The Belgian décumul Rule -- 3.1 General Principles of Liability Under Belgian Law -- 3.2 Combined Prosecution but not Always Combined Punishment: The décumul Rule -- 4 Some Final Observations and Critical Remarks -- References
  • T̀riggering Personś in Èx Criminé Liability of Legal Entities -- 1 The Legal Systems of Member States Giving Relevance to the Sole L̀eading Positioń of the Offender -- 2 Searching for Common Traits Within Member Stateś Legislation Attaching Importance to Unlawful Types of Conduct Both of Subj... -- 3 The Legal Systems of Member States Giving Relevance to Unlawful Types of Conduct Carried Out by a T̀hird Persoń External to... -- 3.1 External T̀hird Personś as Representatives of the Legal Entity -- 3.2 External T̀hird Personś Acting on Behalf of, or for the Benefit of, the Corporation -- 4 Concluding Remarks. Perspectives on Approximation and Harmonization of Member Stateś Legal Systems -- 4.1 C̀ommon Ground:́ Offences Committed by a Person in a L̀eading Positioń -- 4.2 Why Not Any Èmployeé Should Trigger Corporate Liability Èx Criminé -- 4.3 Why Not Any T̀hird Persoń Should Trigger Corporate Liability Èx Criminé -- 4.4 Proposal for a Common Regulation -- References -- Corporate Criminal Liability in Italy: Criteria for Ascribing À̀ctus Reuś ́and Unintentional Crimes -- 1 Introduction -- 2 The Ì̀nterest and the Advantage Test́́ and Unintentional Criminal Offences -- 3 Case Law Development -- References -- Part III: Corporate Crimes: Corruption, Money Laundering and Beyond -- Mitigating the Risks of Corruption Through Collective Action -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Elements of an Anti-Corruption Compliance Program -- 3 Business-Driven Integrity Through Collective Action -- 4 Conclusions -- References -- The New Money Laundering Law in Brazil: Understanding Criminal Compliance Programs -- 1 The Culture of Corporate Criminal Liability (Klaus Tiedemann) -- 2 The Brazilian Anti-Money Laundering System -- 3 Imposing Limits: Why Do We Need Criminal Compliance? -- References
  • The Concept of Defining and Combating Market Manipulation in Existing and Proposed EU Legislation -- 1 Market Manipulation: A Threat for Capital Markets -- 2 The Market Abuse Directive -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 The Prohibition and the Definition of Market Manipulation -- 2.2.1 Price Manipulation -- 2.2.2 Fictitious Transactions -- 2.2.3 Information-Based Manipulation -- 3 Proposals of New Regulation to Combat Market Manipulation -- 4 Conclusions -- References -- Market Manipulation and Compliance -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Challenges for Criminal Law -- 2 Market Abuse -- 2.1 Financial Markets and Investor Confidence -- 2.2 Challenges of International Criminal Law -- 2.3 The M̀̀echanicś ́of Market Manipulation -- 3 Compliance -- 3.1 Compliance in Banks and Financial Institutions -- 3.2 Compliance in Companies -- 4 Conclusions -- References -- Towards an EU Strategy to Combat Trafficking and Labor Exploitation in the Supply Chain. Connecting Corporate Criminal Liabili... -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Criminal Accountability of Companies for a Separate Crime of Knowingly Using Trafficking Victims -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Discussion -- 2.2.1 The Difficult Distinction Between Voluntary and Forced Labor -- 2.2.2 The Difficult Establishment or Proof of Guilty Knowledge of Companies -- 3 Criminal Accountability for Participation in the Crime of Trafficking in Human Beings -- 4 Due Diligence -- 4.1 Voluntary Self-Regulation -- 4.2 State-Imposed Self-Regulation -- 5 Conclusion: A two-Step Procedure with an Interplay Between Criminalization and Self-Regulation -- References -- Part IV: Corporate Criminal Procedure and Criminal Compliance -- Corporate Criminal Liability: Tool or Obstacle to Prosecution? -- 1 Corporate Criminal Liability as a Prosecution Instrument -- 2 Specialties of Prosecuting Corporate Crimes
  • 3 On the Situation in the U.S.: Criticism to the Misuse of Prosecutorial Power -- 3.1 Privilege Against Self-Incrimination -- 3.2 Facilitating Employee Cooperation -- 3.3 Employeeś Right Not to Testify -- 3.4 Employeeś Legal Expenses -- 3.5 Attorney-Client and Work Product Privilege -- 3.6 The Necessity of Limiting Prosecutorial Power -- 4 The Different Situation in Continental Countries: With Special Reference to the Spanish Case -- 4.1 A Different Approach -- 4.2 Right Against Self-Incrimination -- 4.3 Consequences Beyond Criminal Proceedings -- 4.4 Inviolability of the Home -- 4.5 Attorney-Client Privilege -- 5 Conclusions: Learning from the Mistakes of Others -- References -- Minimum Procedural Rights for Corporations in Corporate Criminal Procedure -- 1 Constitutional Law and Human Rights as Boundaries to Policy Options -- 1.1 Introduction -- 1.2 German Constitutional Law -- 1.3 ECHR -- 1.4 CFR -- 1.5 ICCPR -- 2 Whether a Criminal Procedure Is Required Depends on the Legal Consequences -- 2.1 Incapacitation -- 2.1.1 Incapacitation by Disqualification to Run a Business, by Winding Up the Entity or by Supervision -- 2.1.2 Incapacitation by Forfeiture of Contraband -- 2.2 Monetary Restitution of Victims and Forfeiture of Proceeds of Crime -- 2.3 Punishment -- 2.3.1 Forfeiture of Instrumentalities or Tools of Crime -- 2.3.2 Fines -- 2.4 Conclusion -- 3 Procedural Rights for Corporations -- 3.1 No Equal Protection of Legal Persons -- 3.1.1 Influence of Art. 5 ECHR and the H̀̀ard Core of Criminal Laẃ ́-- 3.1.2 Limping Principle of Individual Guilt -- 3.1.3 Conclusion -- 3.2 Standard and Burden of Proof -- 3.3 Right Against Self-Incrimination (Nemo Tenetur) -- 3.4 Ne Bis In Idem -- 4 Side-Effects, Spill-Overs and Collateral Damage to the Criminal Justice System -- References -- Compliance Programs as Evidence in Criminal Cases
  • 1 The Admission of Compliance Programs as Relevant Evidence
Control code
UMKCLawddaEBC1782880
Dimensions
unknown
Edition
1st ed.
Extent
1 online resource (352 pages)
Form of item
online
Isbn
9783319059938
Media category
computer
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Media type code
  • c
Note
UMKC Law: DDA record.
Sound
unknown sound
Specific material designation
remote
System control number
  • (MiAaPQ)EBC1782880
  • (Au-PeEL)EBL1782880
  • (CaPaEBR)ebr10890806
  • (OCoLC)884587604
Label
Regulating Corporate Criminal Liability :
Publication
Copyright
Carrier category
online resource
Carrier category code
  • cr
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Color
multicolored
Content category
text
Content type code
  • txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Contents
  • Preface -- Contents -- List of Contributors -- Regulating Corporate Criminal Liability: An Introduction -- 1 On the Need to Regulate Corporate Criminal Liability -- 2 Diverging Regulatory Approaches in Corporate Criminal Liability -- 2.1 Attributing Corporate Crimes to Corporations and the Sanctioning of Corporations -- 2.2 Corporate Criminal Procedure -- 2.3 Transnational and International Corporate Criminal Justice -- 3 Rethinking Corporate Criminal Justice -- 4 On the Third Symposium for Young Penalists -- References -- Part I: Regulatory Options in Corporate Criminal Liability -- Corporate Criminal Liability as a Third Track -- 1 Historical Introduction -- 2 Deterring Economic Actors -- 3 Regulatory Options in Corporate Criminal Law -- 4 Conclusions -- References -- Where Is the Moral Indignation Over Corporate Crime? -- 1 What Happened to Our Moral Indignation? -- 2 Faux Indignation Meets Corporate Inauthenticity -- 3 Measured Indignation and the Bad Guys -- References -- A Psychological Perspective on Punishing Corporate Entities -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Why Do We Punish Individuals and Why Should We Punish Collective Entities? -- 3 The Group/Corporate Mind -- 4 Over-Personalization of Intent -- 4.1 Individual Versus Organizational Based Judgments of Culpability and Punishment -- 5 The Provision of Rights to Corporations Versus Individuals -- 6 The Legal Implications of the Psychology of Culpability and Punishment -- 7 Summary -- References -- Decision and Punishment: Or-Hold Bankers Responsible! Corporate Criminal Liability from an Economic Perspective -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Who Decides? -- 3 Who Is Punished? -- 4 What to Do? -- References -- Corporate Criminal Liability from a Comparative Perspective -- 1 Status of Corporate Criminal Liability -- 1.1 International Development -- 1.2 National Developments -- 2 Prevailing Models
  • 2.1 Construction of Responsibility -- 2.1.1 Common Standard: The Individualized Model -- 2.1.2 Open Questions -- 2.2 Sanctions -- 3 New Approaches -- 3.1 Shortcomings of the Individualized Model -- 3.2 The New Emphasis on Prevention -- 3.2.1 Compliance Movement -- 3.2.2 Due Supervision and Control -- 3.2.3 Opening the Discussion -- 3.3 Alternative Solutions -- 3.3.1 Responsibility -- 3.3.2 Sanctions -- 3.3.3 Proceedings -- 4 Perspectives -- 4.1 Preventive Effects of Compliance and Corporate Criminal Liability -- 4.2 Regulated Self-Regulation -- 4.2.1 Self-Regulation and Regulation -- 4.2.2 Regulated Self-Regulation -- 4.2.3 Levels of Regulated Self-Regulation -- Informal Support by the State -- Rewarding Compliance -- Sanctioning the Lack of Compliance -- Excluding Responsibility -- General Obligation to Implement Compliance Programs -- 5 Conclusion -- References -- Part II: Models in Attributing Criminal Liability to Corporations -- The Austrian Model of Attributing Criminal Responsibility to Legal Entities -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Liability Model -- 3 Criteria for Establishing Criminal Responsibility -- 3.1 T̀̀riggering Personś ́-- 3.2 Underlying Criminal Offence (Anlasstat) -- 3.2.1 Offences Committed by Decision Makers -- 3.2.2 Offences Committed by Staff-Members -- 3.3 Additional Connection Between the Criminal Offence and the Sphere of the Entity -- 4 Summary Overview -- References -- The Belgian décumul Rule: A sui generis Approach to Criminal Liability of Corporate Agents -- 1 Development of the Concept of Corporate Criminal Liability in Belgium -- 2 Article 5 of the Belgian Criminal Code -- 3 The Belgian décumul Rule -- 3.1 General Principles of Liability Under Belgian Law -- 3.2 Combined Prosecution but not Always Combined Punishment: The décumul Rule -- 4 Some Final Observations and Critical Remarks -- References
  • T̀riggering Personś in Èx Criminé Liability of Legal Entities -- 1 The Legal Systems of Member States Giving Relevance to the Sole L̀eading Positioń of the Offender -- 2 Searching for Common Traits Within Member Stateś Legislation Attaching Importance to Unlawful Types of Conduct Both of Subj... -- 3 The Legal Systems of Member States Giving Relevance to Unlawful Types of Conduct Carried Out by a T̀hird Persoń External to... -- 3.1 External T̀hird Personś as Representatives of the Legal Entity -- 3.2 External T̀hird Personś Acting on Behalf of, or for the Benefit of, the Corporation -- 4 Concluding Remarks. Perspectives on Approximation and Harmonization of Member Stateś Legal Systems -- 4.1 C̀ommon Ground:́ Offences Committed by a Person in a L̀eading Positioń -- 4.2 Why Not Any Èmployeé Should Trigger Corporate Liability Èx Criminé -- 4.3 Why Not Any T̀hird Persoń Should Trigger Corporate Liability Èx Criminé -- 4.4 Proposal for a Common Regulation -- References -- Corporate Criminal Liability in Italy: Criteria for Ascribing À̀ctus Reuś ́and Unintentional Crimes -- 1 Introduction -- 2 The Ì̀nterest and the Advantage Test́́ and Unintentional Criminal Offences -- 3 Case Law Development -- References -- Part III: Corporate Crimes: Corruption, Money Laundering and Beyond -- Mitigating the Risks of Corruption Through Collective Action -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Elements of an Anti-Corruption Compliance Program -- 3 Business-Driven Integrity Through Collective Action -- 4 Conclusions -- References -- The New Money Laundering Law in Brazil: Understanding Criminal Compliance Programs -- 1 The Culture of Corporate Criminal Liability (Klaus Tiedemann) -- 2 The Brazilian Anti-Money Laundering System -- 3 Imposing Limits: Why Do We Need Criminal Compliance? -- References
  • The Concept of Defining and Combating Market Manipulation in Existing and Proposed EU Legislation -- 1 Market Manipulation: A Threat for Capital Markets -- 2 The Market Abuse Directive -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 The Prohibition and the Definition of Market Manipulation -- 2.2.1 Price Manipulation -- 2.2.2 Fictitious Transactions -- 2.2.3 Information-Based Manipulation -- 3 Proposals of New Regulation to Combat Market Manipulation -- 4 Conclusions -- References -- Market Manipulation and Compliance -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Challenges for Criminal Law -- 2 Market Abuse -- 2.1 Financial Markets and Investor Confidence -- 2.2 Challenges of International Criminal Law -- 2.3 The M̀̀echanicś ́of Market Manipulation -- 3 Compliance -- 3.1 Compliance in Banks and Financial Institutions -- 3.2 Compliance in Companies -- 4 Conclusions -- References -- Towards an EU Strategy to Combat Trafficking and Labor Exploitation in the Supply Chain. Connecting Corporate Criminal Liabili... -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Criminal Accountability of Companies for a Separate Crime of Knowingly Using Trafficking Victims -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Discussion -- 2.2.1 The Difficult Distinction Between Voluntary and Forced Labor -- 2.2.2 The Difficult Establishment or Proof of Guilty Knowledge of Companies -- 3 Criminal Accountability for Participation in the Crime of Trafficking in Human Beings -- 4 Due Diligence -- 4.1 Voluntary Self-Regulation -- 4.2 State-Imposed Self-Regulation -- 5 Conclusion: A two-Step Procedure with an Interplay Between Criminalization and Self-Regulation -- References -- Part IV: Corporate Criminal Procedure and Criminal Compliance -- Corporate Criminal Liability: Tool or Obstacle to Prosecution? -- 1 Corporate Criminal Liability as a Prosecution Instrument -- 2 Specialties of Prosecuting Corporate Crimes
  • 3 On the Situation in the U.S.: Criticism to the Misuse of Prosecutorial Power -- 3.1 Privilege Against Self-Incrimination -- 3.2 Facilitating Employee Cooperation -- 3.3 Employeeś Right Not to Testify -- 3.4 Employeeś Legal Expenses -- 3.5 Attorney-Client and Work Product Privilege -- 3.6 The Necessity of Limiting Prosecutorial Power -- 4 The Different Situation in Continental Countries: With Special Reference to the Spanish Case -- 4.1 A Different Approach -- 4.2 Right Against Self-Incrimination -- 4.3 Consequences Beyond Criminal Proceedings -- 4.4 Inviolability of the Home -- 4.5 Attorney-Client Privilege -- 5 Conclusions: Learning from the Mistakes of Others -- References -- Minimum Procedural Rights for Corporations in Corporate Criminal Procedure -- 1 Constitutional Law and Human Rights as Boundaries to Policy Options -- 1.1 Introduction -- 1.2 German Constitutional Law -- 1.3 ECHR -- 1.4 CFR -- 1.5 ICCPR -- 2 Whether a Criminal Procedure Is Required Depends on the Legal Consequences -- 2.1 Incapacitation -- 2.1.1 Incapacitation by Disqualification to Run a Business, by Winding Up the Entity or by Supervision -- 2.1.2 Incapacitation by Forfeiture of Contraband -- 2.2 Monetary Restitution of Victims and Forfeiture of Proceeds of Crime -- 2.3 Punishment -- 2.3.1 Forfeiture of Instrumentalities or Tools of Crime -- 2.3.2 Fines -- 2.4 Conclusion -- 3 Procedural Rights for Corporations -- 3.1 No Equal Protection of Legal Persons -- 3.1.1 Influence of Art. 5 ECHR and the H̀̀ard Core of Criminal Laẃ ́-- 3.1.2 Limping Principle of Individual Guilt -- 3.1.3 Conclusion -- 3.2 Standard and Burden of Proof -- 3.3 Right Against Self-Incrimination (Nemo Tenetur) -- 3.4 Ne Bis In Idem -- 4 Side-Effects, Spill-Overs and Collateral Damage to the Criminal Justice System -- References -- Compliance Programs as Evidence in Criminal Cases
  • 1 The Admission of Compliance Programs as Relevant Evidence
Control code
UMKCLawddaEBC1782880
Dimensions
unknown
Edition
1st ed.
Extent
1 online resource (352 pages)
Form of item
online
Isbn
9783319059938
Media category
computer
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Media type code
  • c
Note
UMKC Law: DDA record.
Sound
unknown sound
Specific material designation
remote
System control number
  • (MiAaPQ)EBC1782880
  • (Au-PeEL)EBL1782880
  • (CaPaEBR)ebr10890806
  • (OCoLC)884587604

Library Locations

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      500 E. 52nd Street, Kansas City, MO, 64110, US
      39.032488 -94.581967
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