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The Resource Changing Federal Constitutions, Volume 420 : Lessons from International Comparison

Changing Federal Constitutions, Volume 420 : Lessons from International Comparison

Label
Changing Federal Constitutions, Volume 420 : Lessons from International Comparison
Title
Changing Federal Constitutions, Volume 420
Title remainder
Lessons from International Comparison
Creator
Contributor
Subject
Language
eng
Cataloging source
MiAaPQ
http://library.link/vocab/creatorName
Benz, Arthur
LC call number
K3168 -- .C43 2012eb
Literary form
non fiction
Nature of contents
dictionaries
http://library.link/vocab/relatedWorkOrContributorName
Knüpling, Felix
http://library.link/vocab/subjectName
  • Constitutional amendments
  • Constitutions
Label
Changing Federal Constitutions, Volume 420 : Lessons from International Comparison
Instantiates
Publication
Copyright
Carrier category
online resource
Carrier category code
  • cr
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Color
multicolored
Content category
text
Content type code
  • txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Contents
  • Changing Federal Constitutions -- Content -- Preface -- Welcome Address of the Secretary General of the Bundesrat -- Introduction -- 1. Federal constitutions -- 2. Varieties of federalism and their constitutions -- 3. Relevance and difficulty of constitutional change -- 4. Cases covered in this volume and contributions -- 5. Comparing incomparable cases? -- 1. The Relevance of Constitutional Change -- Unity versus Diversity. Federalism as an Ever Evolving System -- Constitutional Change in Federal Countries: Comparative Considerations -- 1. Constitutional change: normal, not exceptional -- 2. Factors associated with constitutional longevity -- 3. Issues of explicit versus implicit change -- 4. Dynamics of constitutional replacement and amendment -- 5. Conclusion -- References -- 2. Constitutional Reform in {u201E}Co-operative" Federalism -- Swiss Federalism, Fiscal Equalisation Reform and the Reallocation of Tasks -- 1. Introduction -- 2. The federalism debate in Switzerland -- 3. A "constitutional moment" -- 4. Setting the agenda: defining the constitutional problem -- 5. Negotiations -- 5.1 Phase 1 (1994-1996): Preparing the "guidelines" -- 5.2 Phase 2 (1997-2000): Fleshing out the "guidelines" and the final report of the project team -- 5.3 Phase 3 (2000-2001): Preparing the legislative proposals and the message to Parliament -- 6. Ratification -- 6.1 Parliamentary decision -- 6.2 The referendum -- 6.2.1 The instruments of direct democracy in Switzerland -- 6.2.2 The NFA referendum -- 7. Evolution after the referendum -- 8. Reasons for the successful implementation of the NFA -- References -- Why Federal Reform Succeeded in Switzerland -- 1. Introduction -- 2. The reform process -- 3. Evaluation -- 3.1 High demands on coordination -- 3.2 Opportunities for innovation and their limits -- 3.3 Comprehensive and discursive decision-making
  • 3.4 The NFA: A balanced, win-win solution -- 4. Key factors of success -- References -- The "Austrian Convention": The Failure of an Ambitious Reform -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Institutions of the Austrian Convention -- 2.1 Plenum -- 2.2 Steering committee -- 2.3 Committees -- 2.4 Specific requirements for Convention discussions -- 2.4.1 The absence of designated political representatives and the formation of political camps -- 2.4.2 The role of the experts -- 2.4.3 Media coverage -- 3. Results -- 3.1 The report of the steering committee -- 3.2 The scope of the consensus reached by the Convention -- 3.2.1 Simplification and incorporation of the constitutional documents -- 3.2.2 Maintaining the status quo in the main features of the state structure -- 3.2.3 Legal protection -- 4. The conflict over federalism in the Austrian Convention -- 4.1 Previous reform attempts and the paradigm shift of the Austrian Convention -- 4.2 The attempt to throw a great pitch: the "Fiedler Draft" -- 4.3 The position of the Landeshauptleute -- 5. Other areas of conflict -- 5.1 Administrative reform caught between the resistance toinnovation and the wrong track -- 5.2 Finances -- 5.3 Fundamental Rights -- 6. Summary and future outlook -- References -- Constitutional Negotiations in Cooperative Federalism - The Case of Germany -- 1. The initial context -- 2. The process of constitutional reform -- 2.2 Federalism Reform II -- 3. Important results of the reforms -- 3.1 Federalism Reform I -- 3.1.1 Changes concerning the assent of the Bundesrat in federal legislation -- 3.1.2 Separation of legislative powers between the federal and the Länderlevel -- 3.1.3 Reduced number of instruments for joint financing -- 3.2 Federalism Reform II -- 3.2.1 Financial issues -- 3.2.2 Administrative issues -- 4. Assessment of the results -- 4.1 Federalism Reform I -- 4.2 Federalism Reform II
  • 5. Conclusion -- 3. Constitutional Reform in Federal Systems with Divided Societies -- Federal Reform and Party Politics. The Case of the Fifth Belgian State Reform -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Federalism and party politics -- 3. The fifth Belgian state reform -- 4. The negotiation procedures -- 4.1 The Conference of State Reforms (COSTA/COREE) -- 4.2 The Hermes and Lambermont Agreements -- 4.3 The Lombard and Saint-Boniface Agreements -- 4.4 The parliamentary debates and votes -- 5. Conflict lines -- 5.1 Majority vs. opposition -- 5.2 Divisions between majority parties -- 5.3 Divisions within parties -- 6. Conclusion -- References -- Negotiating the Charlottetown Accord in Canada -- 1. Introduction -- 2. The constitutional moment -- 2.1 The Oka crisis -- 2.2 Quebec's reaction to Meech Lake -- 3. Consultations -- 3.1 Quebec -- 3.1.1 The Allaire Committee -- 3.1.2 Belanger-Campeau Committee -- 4. The federal government -- 4.1 The Spicer Commission -- 4.2 Beaudoin-Edwards Committee -- 5. The provinces -- 6. Aboriginal committee -- 7. The Unity Committee -- 7.1 The consultative conferences -- 7.2 A Renewed Canada -- 8. Negotiating Charlottetown -- 8.1 Multilateral negotiations -- 8.1.1 Reaching a consensus -- 8.1.2 Problems with the multilateral talks -- 9. First Ministers Conference (without Quebec) -- 10. The Pearson Accord -- 11. The Final First Ministers' Conference (including Quebec) -- 11.1 The Charlottetown Accord -- 11.2 Unity and diversity -- 11.3 Institutions -- 11.4 Roles and responsibilities -- 11.5 First peoples -- 11.6 The amending formula -- 12. The referendum -- 12.1 The campaign -- 12.2 Explaining failure -- 13. Charlottetown: A success? -- 14. Conclusion -- References -- The Limits of Flexibility for Constitutional Change and the Uses of Sub-national Constitutional Space: The Case of Spain -- 1. Introduction
  • 2. The goals, process and paradoxical results of the recent round of reform: some examples from Catalonia and Andalusia -- 2.1 The Catalan and Andalusian reforms -- 2.2 The role of the Constitutional Court in sanctioning or rejecting implicit change: the 2010 judgment on the Catalan Statute -- 3. Unravelling the positive and the negative potential of the system for constitutional change -- 3.1 The institutional framework for reform in Spain and its alleged openness -- 3.2 The potential positive consequences of this institutional arrangements for reform -- 3.3 The negative flipside of too much flexibility: the possibility of unilateral reinterpretation of the constitution -- 3.4 What are then the conditions of success and failure of implicit constitutional change? -- 4. Conclusion: the problem with implicit change and the limits of flexibility in Spain -- References -- 4. Devolution and Regionalisation in Federalising States -- Britain's Constitutional Moment -- 1. Introduction: in search of the constitution -- 2. The UK's "constitutional moment" and the party system -- 2.1 Northern Ireland -- 2.2 Scotland and Wales -- 2.3 England and devolution -- 3. Devolution's impact on constitutional evolution - continuation of constitutional moment -- References -- Federalising a Regionalised State. Constitutional Change in Italy -- 1. The rise of constitutional politics -- 2. From regionalisation to federal reform -- 3. Reform attempts of the Prodi government -- 4. Federal reform of the D'Alema government -- 5. The failed "reform of the reform" -- 6. Outcomes and achievements -- Decentralisation and Territorial Reforms in France: How Constitutional Constraints impact Strategies for Reform -- 1. Introduction -- 2. The rule of constitutional amendment controlled by the Senate
  • 3. The French Senate as a "demos-constraining" chamber and cornerstone of constitutional stability: the constitutionalisation of a "rotten boroughs" compromise -- 4. The consequence of the "demos-constraining" compromise: making a degree of municipal federalisation constitutional -- 5. The Senate as an agency to preserve the territorial status quo -- 6. The importance of a very costly precedent: the failed 1969 referendum -- 7. Explicit but ineffective constitutional reforms -- 8. Incremental constitutional evolution and the hidden agenda of territorial reforms -- 9. The persistently ambiguous effects of the hidden agenda of territorial reforms -- 10. Conclusion -- References -- 5. Processes of Ratification -- Constitutional Amendment Rules in Federal and Unitary States -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Right to initiate constitutional amendments -- 3. Majority requirements and other stabilising methods -- 4. Instruments to reinforce legitimacy -- 5. Exclusion of core principles from amendment -- 6. Conclusion -- References -- Constitutional Rigidity and Procedures for Ratifying Constitutional Reforms in EU Member States -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Theoretical reasons for choice of amendment rules -- 2.1 Two views on constitutional reform -- 2.1.1 The Jeffersonian view -- 2.1.2 The Madisonian view -- 2.2 Writing a constitution and ratifying it: the subject of popular sovereignty -- 3. The effect of ratification rules on amendment rates -- 3.1 The dependent variable: the amendability of constitutions -- 3.2 The independent variables: the rigity index -- 3.2.1 Preliminary considerations: entrenchment and the existence of more than one constitutional reform procedure -- 3.2.2 Indicators and scores for parliamentary requirements -- 3.2.3 Indicators and scores for veto players -- 3.2.4 Federal versus non-federal states
  • 3.2.5 Summary: A European model of constitutional amendment procedure?
Control code
UMKCLawddaEBC3117538
Dimensions
unknown
Extent
1 online resource (420 pages)
Form of item
online
Isbn
9783866495531
Media category
computer
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Media type code
  • c
Note
UMKC Law: DDA record.
Sound
unknown sound
Specific material designation
remote
System control number
  • (MiAaPQ)EBC3117538
  • (Au-PeEL)EBL3117538
  • (CaPaEBR)ebr10576405
  • (OCoLC)922967620
Label
Changing Federal Constitutions, Volume 420 : Lessons from International Comparison
Publication
Copyright
Carrier category
online resource
Carrier category code
  • cr
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Color
multicolored
Content category
text
Content type code
  • txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Contents
  • Changing Federal Constitutions -- Content -- Preface -- Welcome Address of the Secretary General of the Bundesrat -- Introduction -- 1. Federal constitutions -- 2. Varieties of federalism and their constitutions -- 3. Relevance and difficulty of constitutional change -- 4. Cases covered in this volume and contributions -- 5. Comparing incomparable cases? -- 1. The Relevance of Constitutional Change -- Unity versus Diversity. Federalism as an Ever Evolving System -- Constitutional Change in Federal Countries: Comparative Considerations -- 1. Constitutional change: normal, not exceptional -- 2. Factors associated with constitutional longevity -- 3. Issues of explicit versus implicit change -- 4. Dynamics of constitutional replacement and amendment -- 5. Conclusion -- References -- 2. Constitutional Reform in {u201E}Co-operative" Federalism -- Swiss Federalism, Fiscal Equalisation Reform and the Reallocation of Tasks -- 1. Introduction -- 2. The federalism debate in Switzerland -- 3. A "constitutional moment" -- 4. Setting the agenda: defining the constitutional problem -- 5. Negotiations -- 5.1 Phase 1 (1994-1996): Preparing the "guidelines" -- 5.2 Phase 2 (1997-2000): Fleshing out the "guidelines" and the final report of the project team -- 5.3 Phase 3 (2000-2001): Preparing the legislative proposals and the message to Parliament -- 6. Ratification -- 6.1 Parliamentary decision -- 6.2 The referendum -- 6.2.1 The instruments of direct democracy in Switzerland -- 6.2.2 The NFA referendum -- 7. Evolution after the referendum -- 8. Reasons for the successful implementation of the NFA -- References -- Why Federal Reform Succeeded in Switzerland -- 1. Introduction -- 2. The reform process -- 3. Evaluation -- 3.1 High demands on coordination -- 3.2 Opportunities for innovation and their limits -- 3.3 Comprehensive and discursive decision-making
  • 3.4 The NFA: A balanced, win-win solution -- 4. Key factors of success -- References -- The "Austrian Convention": The Failure of an Ambitious Reform -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Institutions of the Austrian Convention -- 2.1 Plenum -- 2.2 Steering committee -- 2.3 Committees -- 2.4 Specific requirements for Convention discussions -- 2.4.1 The absence of designated political representatives and the formation of political camps -- 2.4.2 The role of the experts -- 2.4.3 Media coverage -- 3. Results -- 3.1 The report of the steering committee -- 3.2 The scope of the consensus reached by the Convention -- 3.2.1 Simplification and incorporation of the constitutional documents -- 3.2.2 Maintaining the status quo in the main features of the state structure -- 3.2.3 Legal protection -- 4. The conflict over federalism in the Austrian Convention -- 4.1 Previous reform attempts and the paradigm shift of the Austrian Convention -- 4.2 The attempt to throw a great pitch: the "Fiedler Draft" -- 4.3 The position of the Landeshauptleute -- 5. Other areas of conflict -- 5.1 Administrative reform caught between the resistance toinnovation and the wrong track -- 5.2 Finances -- 5.3 Fundamental Rights -- 6. Summary and future outlook -- References -- Constitutional Negotiations in Cooperative Federalism - The Case of Germany -- 1. The initial context -- 2. The process of constitutional reform -- 2.2 Federalism Reform II -- 3. Important results of the reforms -- 3.1 Federalism Reform I -- 3.1.1 Changes concerning the assent of the Bundesrat in federal legislation -- 3.1.2 Separation of legislative powers between the federal and the Länderlevel -- 3.1.3 Reduced number of instruments for joint financing -- 3.2 Federalism Reform II -- 3.2.1 Financial issues -- 3.2.2 Administrative issues -- 4. Assessment of the results -- 4.1 Federalism Reform I -- 4.2 Federalism Reform II
  • 5. Conclusion -- 3. Constitutional Reform in Federal Systems with Divided Societies -- Federal Reform and Party Politics. The Case of the Fifth Belgian State Reform -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Federalism and party politics -- 3. The fifth Belgian state reform -- 4. The negotiation procedures -- 4.1 The Conference of State Reforms (COSTA/COREE) -- 4.2 The Hermes and Lambermont Agreements -- 4.3 The Lombard and Saint-Boniface Agreements -- 4.4 The parliamentary debates and votes -- 5. Conflict lines -- 5.1 Majority vs. opposition -- 5.2 Divisions between majority parties -- 5.3 Divisions within parties -- 6. Conclusion -- References -- Negotiating the Charlottetown Accord in Canada -- 1. Introduction -- 2. The constitutional moment -- 2.1 The Oka crisis -- 2.2 Quebec's reaction to Meech Lake -- 3. Consultations -- 3.1 Quebec -- 3.1.1 The Allaire Committee -- 3.1.2 Belanger-Campeau Committee -- 4. The federal government -- 4.1 The Spicer Commission -- 4.2 Beaudoin-Edwards Committee -- 5. The provinces -- 6. Aboriginal committee -- 7. The Unity Committee -- 7.1 The consultative conferences -- 7.2 A Renewed Canada -- 8. Negotiating Charlottetown -- 8.1 Multilateral negotiations -- 8.1.1 Reaching a consensus -- 8.1.2 Problems with the multilateral talks -- 9. First Ministers Conference (without Quebec) -- 10. The Pearson Accord -- 11. The Final First Ministers' Conference (including Quebec) -- 11.1 The Charlottetown Accord -- 11.2 Unity and diversity -- 11.3 Institutions -- 11.4 Roles and responsibilities -- 11.5 First peoples -- 11.6 The amending formula -- 12. The referendum -- 12.1 The campaign -- 12.2 Explaining failure -- 13. Charlottetown: A success? -- 14. Conclusion -- References -- The Limits of Flexibility for Constitutional Change and the Uses of Sub-national Constitutional Space: The Case of Spain -- 1. Introduction
  • 2. The goals, process and paradoxical results of the recent round of reform: some examples from Catalonia and Andalusia -- 2.1 The Catalan and Andalusian reforms -- 2.2 The role of the Constitutional Court in sanctioning or rejecting implicit change: the 2010 judgment on the Catalan Statute -- 3. Unravelling the positive and the negative potential of the system for constitutional change -- 3.1 The institutional framework for reform in Spain and its alleged openness -- 3.2 The potential positive consequences of this institutional arrangements for reform -- 3.3 The negative flipside of too much flexibility: the possibility of unilateral reinterpretation of the constitution -- 3.4 What are then the conditions of success and failure of implicit constitutional change? -- 4. Conclusion: the problem with implicit change and the limits of flexibility in Spain -- References -- 4. Devolution and Regionalisation in Federalising States -- Britain's Constitutional Moment -- 1. Introduction: in search of the constitution -- 2. The UK's "constitutional moment" and the party system -- 2.1 Northern Ireland -- 2.2 Scotland and Wales -- 2.3 England and devolution -- 3. Devolution's impact on constitutional evolution - continuation of constitutional moment -- References -- Federalising a Regionalised State. Constitutional Change in Italy -- 1. The rise of constitutional politics -- 2. From regionalisation to federal reform -- 3. Reform attempts of the Prodi government -- 4. Federal reform of the D'Alema government -- 5. The failed "reform of the reform" -- 6. Outcomes and achievements -- Decentralisation and Territorial Reforms in France: How Constitutional Constraints impact Strategies for Reform -- 1. Introduction -- 2. The rule of constitutional amendment controlled by the Senate
  • 3. The French Senate as a "demos-constraining" chamber and cornerstone of constitutional stability: the constitutionalisation of a "rotten boroughs" compromise -- 4. The consequence of the "demos-constraining" compromise: making a degree of municipal federalisation constitutional -- 5. The Senate as an agency to preserve the territorial status quo -- 6. The importance of a very costly precedent: the failed 1969 referendum -- 7. Explicit but ineffective constitutional reforms -- 8. Incremental constitutional evolution and the hidden agenda of territorial reforms -- 9. The persistently ambiguous effects of the hidden agenda of territorial reforms -- 10. Conclusion -- References -- 5. Processes of Ratification -- Constitutional Amendment Rules in Federal and Unitary States -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Right to initiate constitutional amendments -- 3. Majority requirements and other stabilising methods -- 4. Instruments to reinforce legitimacy -- 5. Exclusion of core principles from amendment -- 6. Conclusion -- References -- Constitutional Rigidity and Procedures for Ratifying Constitutional Reforms in EU Member States -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Theoretical reasons for choice of amendment rules -- 2.1 Two views on constitutional reform -- 2.1.1 The Jeffersonian view -- 2.1.2 The Madisonian view -- 2.2 Writing a constitution and ratifying it: the subject of popular sovereignty -- 3. The effect of ratification rules on amendment rates -- 3.1 The dependent variable: the amendability of constitutions -- 3.2 The independent variables: the rigity index -- 3.2.1 Preliminary considerations: entrenchment and the existence of more than one constitutional reform procedure -- 3.2.2 Indicators and scores for parliamentary requirements -- 3.2.3 Indicators and scores for veto players -- 3.2.4 Federal versus non-federal states
  • 3.2.5 Summary: A European model of constitutional amendment procedure?
Control code
UMKCLawddaEBC3117538
Dimensions
unknown
Extent
1 online resource (420 pages)
Form of item
online
Isbn
9783866495531
Media category
computer
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Media type code
  • c
Note
UMKC Law: DDA record.
Sound
unknown sound
Specific material designation
remote
System control number
  • (MiAaPQ)EBC3117538
  • (Au-PeEL)EBL3117538
  • (CaPaEBR)ebr10576405
  • (OCoLC)922967620

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